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‘Interpretation’ – An Exploration of Mimamsa & its Contemporary Relevance


Certainty in “law” and its “interpretation” is a sine qua non for a harmonious society, based on the rule of law. The judiciary shoulders the onerous responsibility of ‘interpreting’ laws by deciphering their meaning and legislative intent. Thus, the courts play a very important role in fulfilling the object for which the statute was enacted, and in promoting justice and social welfare. “The part that these rules (of interpretation) play in the administration of justice is by no means less important that the rules of procedure or the rules of evidence”.[1]

The English Courts have evolved various canons of interpretation like the ‘literal rule’, ‘mischief rule’, ‘purposive interpretation’ and others, for statutory interpretation. In India, the Mīmāṃsā principles, authored by eminent Vedic scholars and logicians well-versed in language and grammar, to interpret the śrutivākyās (Vedas), came to be applied to interpret the vyavahāra portions of the Smritis which deal with civil and criminal laws.[2] The Mīmāṃsā principles were also used by the British Courts in India, to interpret the personal laws of the Hindus. In the post-independent era too, a few judicial pronouncements have referred to the Mīmāṃsā principles while interpreting statutes. However, the application of Mīmāṃsā principles in the modern context of statutory interpretation has not been consistent. A thorough understanding of the principles is required in order to apply them in modern statutory interpretation. While Mīmāṃsā is a vast area of study, the scope of this paper is limited to exploring the relevance of Mīmāṃsā to statutory interpretation in the contemporary context.

Section 1 deals with the applicability of Mīmāṃsā to legal and statutory interpretation. Section 2 gives a brief framework of Mīmāṃsā. Section 3 deals with the application of Mīmāṃsā principles in judicial pronouncements, while Section 4 discusses the contemporary relevance and challenges in applying Mīmāṃsā principles to modern statutory interpretation.

1. “मीमांसा” (Mīmāṃsā) – applicability to legal and statutory interpretation

The unique contribution of India to the field of interpretation is Mīmāṃsā. The meaning of the word “मीमांसा” (Mīmāṃsā) is “deep reflection, inquiry, examination, investigation”.[3]Mīmāṃsā is one of the 6 (six) principal Darśana​s (schools of philosophy) in Sanātana Dharma. Mīmāṃsā in the context of interpretation of laws, refers to पूर्वमीमांसा (Pūrvamīmāṃsā) or कर्ममीमांसा (Karmamīmāṃsā).[4]Pūrvamīmāṃsā deals with the accurate interpretation of the Vedic rituals “…and the settlement of dubious points in regard to Vedic texts”.[5] The MīmāṃsāSūtras were formulated to interpret the cryptic Vedic texts in Sanskrit, which laid down the rules for rituals and religious ceremonies.[6] The Mimamsakas constructed “…hyperfine doctrines of ascertainment of the meaning” of śrutivākyās (Vedas), which “…led them to an elaborate process of reconciliation of conflicts and resolution of doubts arising from apparent inconsistencies or contradictions in śruti texts”.[7]Maharshi Jaiminī is the oldest renowned author of the monumental work under the title Mīmāṃsā”.[8]Jaiminī’s Sutras “… are decidedly the most comprehensive and prevailing authority on the subject of interpretation”.[9]

According to Hon’ble Rama Jois, J., “(t)he prescription of Mimamsa as a qualification for judges spells out the importance in the interpretation of civil and criminal law”.[10]Coolebrooke declared that, “The disquisitions of the Mīmāṃsā bear…certain resemblance to judicial questions…The logic of the Mimamsa is the logic of the law…Each case is examined and determined upon general principles; and from the cases decided the principles may be collected. A well-ordered arrangement of them would constitute the philosophy of the law, and this is, in truth, what has been attempted in the Mīmāṃsā”.[11]

While Mīmāṃsā originally dealt with spiritual duties and rituals, the scientific method of inquiry and interpretation was equally applicable to laws, civil duties and the like. The applicability of Mīmāṃsā to statutory interpretation has been explained by K. L. Sarkar in detail[12] and summarised hereinbelow:

(i)  The “investigation of spiritual law and spiritual duty” which is the subject matter of Mīmāṃsā, is “…entirely analogous and similar to that of legal duty and positive civil law”.[13]

(ii)  Mīmāṃsā “looks at the words alone”; “…Mimansakas start with the words and then follow out their consequences”.[14]In this way, Mīmāṃsā“…is identical with the judicial principles of interpretation”.[15] Contemporary statutory interpretation also begins with the words used in the statute and their literal meaning.

(iii)  “…(t)he authority of Mimamsa principles for interpretation of law has been recognised from ancient times…”[16]They have been referred to and / or relied on by Apastamba, Baudhayana, Vasista, Vijnaneshvara, Jimutavahana[17] and have been used to “…reconcile, harmonise and interpret conflicting or ambiguous statements contained in different Smritis or in the same Smriti”.[18]

Prior to independence, the Privy Council and the British Courts in India have referred to and / or applied the Mīmāṃsā rules to interpret the personal laws of the Hindus[19] while deciding cases pertaining to adoption[20], succession[21], validity of marriage[22]etc. However, it may be seen that the reference to Mīmāṃsā principles in courts in the post-independent era has sharply declined.[23]

2. Mīmāṃsā– Basic Framework

An understanding of the basic framework of Mīmāṃsā helps in analysing its relevance to modern statutory interpretation. A basic framework of the procedure, principles, and axioms in Mīmāṃsā is set out below.

2.1 Adhikarana – Procedure For Interpretation

Mīmāṃsā has a specific procedure for interpretation – “Adhikarana”, as described by Kumarilabhatta[24]:





The 5 constituents of adhikaraṇa, according to Kumarilabhatta, are as follows:

(i)  viṣayaḥ – subject / text which has to be interpreted;

(ii)  viśayaḥ – doubt / ambiguity;

(iii)  pūrvapakṣaḥ – first side or postulation of a probable meaning;[26]

(iv)  uttaram – response / answer / counter-argument;

(v)  nirṇayah – conclusion.

Thus, adhikaraṇa gives us a systematic procedure to be followed for any interpretation. As noted by K. L. Sarkar, “…this process of adhikaraṇa is unobjectionable. It gives a prominent place to the view opposed to what is eventually adopted by way of conclusion, which by this method acquires a greater clearness and strength than otherwise would have been the case. This mode of argumentation, consisting of purvapaksha or prima facie argument, the uttara or refutation of it, and then the siddhanta or conclusion, is peculiar to the Hindu literature. It pervades all Sanskrit discoursive works. The system of adhikarana has been followed in Uttara Mimamsa or Vedanta”.[27] Thus, we see that the procedure of adhikarana has universal application, and may be adopted for interpretation of laws, contracts, etc.

2.2  Axioms Of Interpretation

The objective of interpretation is to understand the meaning and intent behind a provision of law. To aid the process of interpretation, Jaimini lays down certain elementary principles / axioms:

  1. सार्थक्यताs ārthakyatā – “Every word and sentence must have some meaning and purpose”.[28] Any interpretation which rendered a provision nugatory or otiose is faulty, and suffers from अनार्थक्यदोषः anārthakyadoṣaḥ.[29] This flows from the “literal rule” of construction in modern jurisprudence.[30] Further, any interpretation which would render any word / provision otiose will not be favoured.[31]
  2. लाघव​lāghava​ – “Where one rule or proposition would suffice, more must not be assumed”.[32]
  3. अर्थैकत्व​arthaikatva​ (unity in meaning) – Consistency in interpretation of the same word – “unless there are special reasons to do so, i.e., unless the context otherwise requires, a word must be given the same meaning at all places in a text wherever it is used.[33]
  4. गुणप्रधान​ – guṇapradhāna​ – When the subordinate / ancillary idea purports to contradict / is in conflict with the principal, the ancillary should be interpreted in such a way that the principal remains, or the ancillary should be disregarded altogether.[34]
  5. समञ्जस्य​ – samañjasya – harmonious construction – “Contradiction between words and sentences is not to be presumed where it is possible to reconcile them.”[35]The rule of harmonious construction is well-established in modern statutory interpretation.
  6. विकल्प – vikalpa – In cases of real contradiction, one of the options may be chosen.[36]

The aforementioned axioms may be applied in modern statutory interpretation too. A few decisions post-independence have applied them for interpreting statutes (elaborated in Section 3).

2.3  Hierarchical Principles Of Interpretation

Not only does Mīmāṃsā give us precise tools for interpretation, but also lays down the order of priority. The following Sutra by Jaimini makes this clear:

JaiminiIII, iii, 14

श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यम् अर्थविप्रकर्षात् ।[37]


(“Among the rules,śruti(direct assertion), liṅga (indicative power), vākya (syntactical connection), prakaraṇa (context), sthāna (place) and samākhyā (name), that which follows is weaker than that which precedes, because it is more remote than the real object”.)[38]

As noted from the above Sutra of Jaimini, rules of interpretation are as follows:

  1. Śruti (direct assertion) – “When a sentence is complete and explicit in sense and grammar, no attempt should be made to strain or twist its meaning. Śruti refers to that meaning which is understood on the mere hearing of the statement. (Śruti means hearing)”.[39] This is the first, fundamental rule of Mimamsa and also the elementary rule of modern jurisprudence. “This is (a) universal principle prevailing in all civilized countries of the present day. It is called the literal principle”.[40]
  2. Liṅga (indicative power) – “When a word or expression used in a provision has more than one meaning, its correct meaning has to be determined by the context in which the word has been used”.[41] Contextual interpretation is an established rule in modern jurisprudence also.
  3. Vākya (syntactical connection) – “When words and sentences are not connected in an explicit or clear manner, they (the words) should be joined grammatically so as to make a sensible proposition”.[42] Modern statutory interpretation also recognises that while interpreting a statute, the ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless it leads to absurdity. The objective behind Vākya (syntactical connection) is that “…the defective grammar or composition of a sentence should not be allowed to defeat the purpose (prayojanaorartha) of the provision.[43]
  4. Prakaraṇa (context) – “…when a sentence or clause makes no complete sense by itself, however clear its meaning and grammatical composition may be, the meaning of such a sentence or clause should be ascertained by reading it with some other passages with which it coalesces, having due regard to the context in which such a clause or sentence is used”.[44]

The aforementioned principles “…form the science of interpretation”[45] in Mīmāṃsā. The literal rule is the starting point of interpretation both in Mimamsa and the modern system. However, as noted by K. L. Sarkar, the rules laid down by Rishi Jaimini and his followers for the departure from the literal rule are “… perhaps clearer, more logical and more distinctive than the rules discussed in our modern books. They lay down step by step how a more rational principle is to be adopted one after the other, and how a wider departure from the literal principle should be avoided when a narrower departure would suffice”.[46]The sequence to be adopted while departing from the literal rule is definitely clearer in Mīmāṃsā compared to modern statutory interpretation. Incorporating the sequence in a Sutra form sets out a clear formula and ensures certainty and consistency in interpretation.

2.4 Obligatory and NON-Obligatory Rules

Mimamsa clearly enunciates rules which are obligatory and non-obligatory:

(i)  Obligatory rules

a.  Vidhis – injunctions / positive commands[47]

b.  Nishedhas–prohibitions / negative commands[48]

(ii)  Non-obligatory rules

a.  Arthavadas – explanatory statements[49]; non-obligatory rules connected with Vidhis[50]

b.  Namadheyas – nomenclature[51]; non-obligatory rules which are not connected with any Vidhi[52]

Sacrificial formulae were referred to as Mantras, which sometimes acquired the character of Vidhi.[53] The distinction between obligatory and non-obligatory rules has been relied on in decisions dealing with validity of adoption etc. Whether a rule / provision is mandatory or directory is an issue confronted by the Courts frequently in the context of statutory interpretation.

2.5  Nyayas (Maxims)

Nyāya or maxim is “…one of the devices by which an experience secured from or a conclusion reached in a particular case can be used to explain a similar situation in a brief and telling manner”.[54] They are also “…based on robust common sense and worldly experience” and may be adopted for interpretation of statutes.[55] Hon’ble Rama Jois, J. opines that they are of immense use like the Latin maxims which have been used in modern jurisprudence.[56] While there are numerous Nyayas, a few which have been referred to in the decisions of Courts and / or which are pertinent to the interpretation of statutes are listed below:

(i)  कलञ्जन्यायः – kalañjanyāyaḥ used to indicate a prohibitory act[57], has been relied on in recent cases involving statutory interpretation and is analogous to the modern rule that “negative expressions are rarely directory”[58];

(ii)  मध्यदीपिकान्यायः – madhyadīpikānyāyaḥ[59]“…a word can be shown to throw light on the preceding as well as the succeeding clause”[60];

(iii)  सामान्यविशेषन्यायः – sāmānyaviśeṣanyāyaḥ – The special law prevails over the general one. This Nyaya corresponds to the Latin maxim ‘Generalia specialibus non derogant’ in modern statutory interpretation;

(iv)  रूढिर्योगमपहरतिः – rūḍhiryogamapaharatiḥ – Popular meaning prevails over the etymological meaning. The “common parlance” test has been frequently used by the Courts, especially in the interpretation of fiscal statutes.

3. Mīmāṃsā Principles – application by Courts

Prior to independence, the Privy Council and the British Courts relied on Mīmāṃsā principles for interpreting Hindu Law in cases pertaining to adoption, marriage, succession etc. “After the codification of most of the personal law of Hindus, recourse to Mimamsa principles has fallen in desuetude”.[61]

One of the celebrated cases which accurately applied the Mīmāṃsā principles to a case of adoption in Hindu Law, was Beni Prasad v. Hardai Bibi and Ors.[62] (“Beni Prasad”), decided by the High Court of Allahabad in 1892. The case concerned the validity of adoption (having taken place in fact) of an only son under Hindu Law. Sir John Edge, J acknowledged that the Court was faced with the difficulty of ascertaining the “…true and reasonable construction to be put on certain texts of the sacred law of the Hindus, and upon certain passages in the works of Hindu commentators…”[63] He further observed that the difficulty was enhanced by the fact that the texts and passages were in Sanskrit.[64] On how the text of Vasistha was to be construed, he opined that “…it must clearly be construed according to the rules for the construction of the texts of the sacred books of the Hindu Law if authoritative rules are on the subject exist. That rules for the construction of the sacred texts and law of the Hindus do exist cannot be disputed, although those rules have been frequently overlooked or not referred to by Judges or English text writers, probably because they are in Sanskrit and have, so far as I am aware, not yet been translated. That they are rules of the highest authority is obvious from the manner in which they have been referred to by Mr. Colebrooke”.[65]

The rule of Mīmāṃsā relied on by the counsel, and accepted by the Judge was that, when a text is supported by assigning a reason, it is not to be deemed as “vidhi” (mandatory), but only as recommendatory (“artha-vada”). “When a text is treated as artha-vada, it follows that it has no obligatory force whatsoever.”[66]

The Court in Beni Prasad has made extensive observations on the need for Sanskrit scholarship to accurately interpret Hindu Law. While formulating the reasoning for the decision, the Court has time and again relied upon the authority of eminent Sanskrit scholars including lawyers well-versed in Sanskrit.[67] The Court also cautioned against relying on “…the mistaken and misleading translations or unauthorised interpolations of English translators…”[68]The same holds good for adapting Mimamsa principles to the modern context as well.

Hon’ble B.N. Srikrishna, J. has lauded the judgment in Beni Prasad for the accurate application of the Mīmāṃsā principles relating to the distinction between Vidhi and Arthavada.[69]

Post-independence, a few judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts (mostly HC of Allahabad) have attempted to apply the Mīmāṃsā principles in the interpretation of statutes.

The Mīmāṃsā rule that “the popular meaning overpowers the etymological meaning” was referred to and applied by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of GUI-ATI and Company v. The Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow[70] In this case, the Court was deciding on whether the expressions “food” and “foodstuff” under the Government Notification[71] in question, included “food colours” and “food essences” for assessing the rate of Sales Tax to be imposed.[72]

The Apex Court noted that “(i)n the interpretation of fiscal statutes, the entries must not prima facie be construed in their technical or scientific import but must be understood in its ordinary sense”. [73]The Court observed that while there was no fixed test for classification of a taxable commodity, the most commonly employed test was the “common parlance test” or “popular sense meaning”. The Court concluded that “foodstuff would refer to anything with a nutritive value which is consumed for growth or sustaining one’s life”.[74]

In the case of B. Premanand and Ors. v. Mohan Koikal and Ors[75], (“Premanand”), the Apex Court made a reference to the Shrutiprinciple and the Garhapatya-NyayaofMīmāṃsā, in the context of applying the literal rule of interpretation. The Court was concerned with the interpretation of Rule 27(c) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1959, for determining the seniority inter se among candidates for a certain post. The Court opined that as the language of Rule 27 (c) was clear and unambiguous, the same had to be followed.[76]

The Court made a reference to several case authorities, both Indian and foreign, in applying the literal rule. In this context, Hon’ble Katju, J. also referred to the Mīmāṃsā Principles and observed that there was “…no reason why we should not use Mīmāṃsā Principles of Interpretation in appropriate occasions”.[77] He noted that, “In Mimansa, the literal rule of interpretation is known as the ‘Shruti’ or ‘Abhida’ principle. This is illustrated by the Garhapatyanyaya”.[78] While the Court has discussed Garhapatyanyaya and the Linga principle, it is not very clear as to how these have been applied to the facts of the case, as the interpretation of the Rule in question was in accordance with the principle of Shruti / plain meaning of the words.

The interpretation of the Proviso in Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 fell for consideration in the case of Vijay Narayan Thatte and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.[79] (“Vijay Narayan”).The Proviso was couched in negative language and the Court observed that it was a well settled rule of interpretation that “…when a Statute is couched in negative language, it is ordinarily regarded as peremptory and mandatory in nature”.[80] According to Crawford, “Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory”.[81]

Hon’ble Katju, J. examined the Proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, in light of Principles, by referring to negative Vidhis. He observed that the Mimamsakas distinguished between: (i) prohibitions against the whole world (pratishedha) & (ii) those against particular persons (paryudasa)[82]. Further, pratishedhas were of two kinds – (i) those which prohibited an act in all circumstances without any reference to the manner / usage and (ii) those which only prohibited a particular mode of usage.[83] He also pointed out that the system had a deeper discussion by classifying the injunctions into various kinds.[84]Nishedha-vidhis were not only mandatory, but also had to be interpreted comprehensively to mean that one had to “…abstain from the very idea of the act prohibited…”[85]The Kalanjanyayah (the Kalanja Maxim)[86] was used to indicate a Nishedha-Vidhi. Applying this maxim, any rule / provision of law “…couched in negative language is prohibitory in nature and therefore such a rule must not be allowed to be violated directly or circumvented indirectly”.[87]

The Court concluded that the Provision to Section 6 was “totally mandatory” and had no exceptions.[88] As the language of the Proviso to Section 6 was clear, the provision had to be construed literally.[89] The Court has lucidly applied the concept of Paryudasa to the interpretation of the Proviso in this case.

In Surjit Singh’s case[90], the Apex Court departed from the literal rule while interpreting Rule 443 of the Indian Telegraph Rules, which provided that in case of default of payment of the dues in accordance with the Rules, the Telegraph Authority could disconnect the service without notice to the subscriber.[91] The issue for consideration was whether the telephone lines in the name of the husband could be disconnected because of non-payment of dues in respect of the line in the name of his wife.[92]

The Court observed that in this case, the literal rule should not be adopted, rather, the intention behind the rule – which was to ensure payment of dues promptly by the subscribers, had to be considered. The Court adopted purposive construction[93] in upholding the action taken by the authority in disconnecting the lines in the names of the husband.

The Learned Judge also relied on the Mīmāṃsā principles and adopted the Lakshana (or Linga) rule, instead of Shruti / Abidha (literal rule), while giving a purposive interpretation to Rule 443 of the Indian Telegraph Rules.[94] Referring to ‘Param Laghu Manjusha’, the work of Sanskrit grammarian, Sri Nagesh Bhatt, the Hon’ble Judge observed that a word / phrase could have three meanings: (i) Abidha / literal meaning (ii) Lakshana (indicative or suggestive meaning) and (iii) Vyanjana (figurative meaning).[95]

Hon’ble Katju, J. made a reference to the 5-fold principles of Shruti, Linga, Vakya, Prakarana, Sthana and Sankhya and opined that Linga (or Lakshana) principle would be applicable in this case.[96] He further relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore[97], in which the Court departed from the literal rule to interpret ‘landless person’ as a ‘landless peasant’ and not a ‘landless businessman’ to interpret a provision of the U.P. Bhoodan Act.[98] It is also interesting to note that Hon’bleKatju, J. demonstrated in this case, as to how a provision in the US Constitution should be interpreted according to Linga, and not Shruti, as interpreting it literally would not serve the purpose or intent behind the provision.[99]

Similarly, in a case concerning the interpretation of an insurance policy, the Allahabad Court did not favour a literal interpretation, rather, favoured a beneficial interpretation to enable the policy holder to claim benefit under the policy.[100] In this case also, the Learned Judge referred to Param Laghu Manjusha[101] and concluded that the indicative meaning (Lakshana) had to be adopted.[102] While applying the Lakshana principle, the Court relied on the oft-quoted sentence- काकेभ्यो दधि रक्षताम् (kākebhyodadhirakṣatām – protect the curd from crows), and observed that literal interpretation (of protecting the curd only from crows, but not dogs, cats etc.) would lead to absurdity.[103] However, it may be noted that Hon’ble B. N. Srikrishna, J. does not favour applying the Lakshana principle to the interpretation of contractual terms which were explicit and clear.[104]

In the case of Rajbir Singh Dalalv. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa and Ors.[105] Hon’ble Katju, J. referred to the principle of Adhyahara in the context of interpreting the relevant UGC Regulations for the requisite academic qualifications for appointment to the post of a Reader in a University. According to him, in Mīmāṃsā, the rule of “casus omissus” is known as Adhyahara.[106] He opined that Mīmāṃsā principles were superior, as Maxwell’s Principles did not go further into the sub-categories of casus omissus, whereas, the Mīmāṃsāsystem lays down sub-categories under Adhyahara – anusanga, anukarsha, vakyashesha etc.[107] However, it is pertinent to note that the decision in this case was not based either oncasus omissus or Adhyahara.

The concepts of Adhyahara and Anusanga were also referred to by the Learned Judge in the case of Mahabir Prasad Dwivedi[108] while deciding on the extension of principles of natural justice to a provision of a statute, though the opportunity of being heard was explicitly mentioned only in the first proviso (and not in the second one).The Learned Judge dealt with the Anusanga principle and its sub-categorisations and applied the same to the proviso in question, while extending the opportunity of being heard to the second proviso also.[109] Commenting on this decision, Hon’ble B. N. Srikrishna, J. notes that Adhyahara “…does not permit the random and arbitrary interpolation of words into a shruti text. The concepts of anushanga, anukarsha, tadutkarsha and tadapakarsha have all to be read and understood within the basic principles of Mimamsa”.[110] He further opined that the opportunity for an explanation in the first proviso could not be read into the second proviso, as the purpose of both the provisos was different.[111] The same conclusion could be achieved relying on Maxwell too, without recourse toMīmāṃsā.[112]

The Samanjasya principle was relied on by the Apex Court in Gujarat Urja Vikash Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd.[113] while dealing with apparent inconsistency in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Electricity Act, 2003. The issue to be decided by the Court was whether one law would prevail over the other. In the course of the arguments, a reference was made to the rule of Generalia Specialibus non derogant, a well-established rule in contemporary jurisprudence, according to which, the special legislation would prevail over the general one.[114]

Hon’ble Katju, J. relied on the Mīmāṃsā system in dealing with conflicts /inconsistencies, and observed that there were three ways of dealing with conflicts, discussed by Shabar Swami in his commentary on Sutra 14, Chapter III, Book III of Jaimini[115] (i) the Samanjasya principle harmonious construction[116] (ii) Vikalpa – when the conflict could not be reconciled, “….whichever law is more in consonance with reason and justice should be preferred”[117] (iii) Badha – one text overrides the other because of greater force.[118] The Gunapradhana axiom was also applied to the provisions in the Electricity Act to reconcile the apparent conflict.[119]

Ispat Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai[120] (“Ispat Industries”) concerned the interpretation of Rules under the parent statute. The Court relied on Gunapradhanaaxiom, according to which “…(i)f a word or sentence purporting to express a subordinate idea clashes with the principal idea, the former must be adjusted to the latter or must be disregarded altogether”.[121] Applying Gunapradhana axiom, Hon’ble Katju, J. concluded that the Rule in question, being subservient to the legislation, had to be interpreted in consonance with the relevant provision of the Customs Act.[122]

In Amit Plastic Industry v. Divisional Level Committee Meerut and Ors[123] (“Amit Plastic”) the Allahabad High Court applied the Gunapradhana axiom[124] and Sphadi-nyaya[125]while interpreting a provision of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. Commenting on the application of Gunapradhana, Hon’ble B. N. Srikrishna, J. opines that the “Pradhana” and “Guna” cannot be “arbitrarily decided by one’s ipse dixit”.[126] He further opines that even assuming the Act to be similar to the Shruti text, one cannot assume the Pradhana when the Act does not declare it.[127]

In U.P. Agro Industrial Corporation Ltd. v. Kisan Upbhokta Parishad and Ors.[128], the short question which arose for consideration was whether Animal Driven Vehicles (“ADVs”) were “agricultural implements”? The Court observed that it was a well-settled rule of interpretation that the word should be construed in its common parlance, unless the statute / order defined it with a specific meaning.[129] Hon’ble Katju, J. relied on the Mīmāṃsā principle that “the popular meaning overpowers the etymological meaning”.[130] While the word “Pankaja” literally meant “born in mud” and could refer to several things, the popular meaning was “lotus”.[131] Applying the common parlance test, the Court held that ADVs could not be ‘implements’, as implements were commonly understood to mean tools.[132]

The issue which fell for consideration in Craft Interiors[133] was whether “…storage cabinets, kitchen counters, running counters, large reception / conference tables etc. (were) excisable as furniture”?[134] On perusal of the definitions in various dictionaries, the Court observed that “…ordinarily ‘furniture’ refers to movable items such as desks, tables, chairs, required for use or ornamentation in a house or office”.[135] The Court held that items which were ordinarily immoveable and which could not be removed without cannibalizing were not ‘furniture’.[136] In this context, Hon’ble Katju, J. also referred to the Mīmāṃsā rules according to which the popular meaning is preferred to the etymological meaning.[137]

In Yogendra Nath[138], the issue which fell for consideration was whether “…the assessment on the deities through shebaits under the provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act was in accordance with law?”[139] While deciding on the question of the juristic personality of the idol, the Court referred to Sabara Swami’s Bhashya on PurvaMimamsa.[140] The Supreme Court held that “…the Hindu idol is a juristic entity capable of holding property and of being taxed through its shebaits who are entrusted with the possession and management of its property”.[141]

In one of the recent judgments[142], the High Court of Gujarat relied on “purposive interpretation” to construe the expression “calendar year”, to avoid absurdity. Observing that both Mīmāṃsā and Maxwell’s Principles recognise “purposive interpretation”, the Court opined that while “…the Maxwell method was search bound”, the Mīmāṃsā rules were “solution-oriented”.[143] The Court however did not elaborate on this distinction. The Court also applied the “Gunapradhana” axiom relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in Ispat Industries and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited[144], and the “Sarthakeya” principle.[145]According to the Court “Sarthakeya” signified that “…meaningfulness has to be ensured in applying any law or rule. Thereby, the purpose is made to prevail over the outward expression which becomes subordinate”.[146]

As seen from the decisions above, there have been attempts by the Courts in recent times to adopt the Mīmāṃsā principles to statutory interpretation. However, application of Mīmāṃsā to modern statutory interpretation, is not without challenges, as detailed below.

4. Contemporary relevance & challenges

The Mīmāṃsā system of interpretation with its procedure of Adhikarana, principles, axioms and Nyayas (maxims) is very detailed and systematic. The Sutras clearly lay down the procedure, rules and hierarchy to be followed in interpretation. Thus, adherence to the Mīmāṃsā system will promote certainty, efficiency and predictability in interpretation. As noted by many scholars and jurists like Coolebrooke, K. L. Sarkar, Rama Jois, J., and Katju, J., the Mīmāṃsā principles are no doubt applicable to the interpretation of laws.
In cases decided by the Privy Council and the British Courts (in Beni Prasad for instance), the primary rules of interpretation relied on, for interpreting the texts of Hindu Law, were Mīmāṃsā principles. The Hon’ble judges and the counsels engaged in a detailed discussion on the accurate interpretation of the Sanskrit texts.

An analysis of the decisions (albeit few in number post-independence) which have relied on Mīmāṃsā principles shows that the Courts have not applied these principles consistently. In the recent cases, Mīmāṃsā principles have been referred to, in addition to the rules of modern statutory interpretation. In other words, reliance on Mīmāṃsā, in many recent cases, seems ancillary, and the same outcome would have been achieved by solely relying on rules of modern statutory interpretation as well. Of course, this is also due to the fact that while the British Courts were dealing with Sanskrit texts on Hindu Law, most of the recent cases pertain to the interpretation of modern statutes in English. In a few decisions, while the Court has explained the Mīmāṃsā rules, the application of the same to the facts of the case is unclear.

Hon’ble B. N. Srikrishna, J. has discussed the challenges faced in applying Mīmāṃsā principles to modern statutory interpretation:

(i)  Accurate application of Mīmāṃsā requires precise knowledge of Sanskrit and appreciation of the Sutra[147]An “…attempt to understand the Mīmāṃsā Sutras without a good working knowledge of Sanskrit would be counter-productive”.[148] Further, many technical Sanskrit terms do not have accurate translations / counterparts in English. This adds to the challenges of applying Sanskrit Sutras while interpreting English statutes.

(ii)  Generations of lawyers have internalised jurisprudential parlance in English over centuries, substituting the same with Mīmāṃsā“…may be attempted only after at least two generations of lawyers are well-trained in the discipline of Mimamsa”.[149]

(iii)  Many terms in Mīmāṃsā have acquired conventional meanings. Lack of familiarity with such technical meanings would impede the accurate application of the principles, resulting in chaos.[150]

(iv)  If the Mīmāṃsā principles are introduced in the higher judiciary – the Supreme Court and the High Courts, it would be hard for the subordinate courts to follow the principles laid down by the higher courts.[151]

(v)  The “…Nyayas and maxims of Mimamsaneed to be formally reduced into universally identified rules” for application by lawyers and judges.[152]

While the aforementioned concerns are well-founded, the application of Mīmāṃsā rules in decisions like Beni Prasad inter alia by British judges, goes to show that it is very much possible to appreciate the nuances of Mīmāṃsā, with the help of Sanskrit scholars.There is a need for engagement with Sanskrit scholars and Mīmāṃsā experts to assist the lawyers and the judiciary to appreciate and accurately apply the principles of Mīmāṃsā.

In many recent decisions, one finds that the Learned Judge suo motu applied the principles of Mīmāṃsā. If the lawyers are trained in this system, they could assist the Court in better applying the principles. Law students could be introduced to these principles and the basics of Sanskrit language in law schools, as suggested by Hon’ble B. N. Srikrishna, J.[153]In this regard, it may be noted that while law students don’t necessarily study Latin, Latin maxims are used very frequently in law treatises, while addressing arguments, and in Court decisions. The familiarity with Latin maxims has led to their application in the legal system.

Introduction of Mīmāṃsā, along with modern statutory interpretation in legal studies would be a step forward in familiarising law students, lawyers and judges with the indigenous system of India, which could be applied in cases where it is most suitable.


The Mīmāṃsā system of interpretation has immense intrinsic and instrumental value – intrinsic value as a Darshana / school of philosophy and instrumental value as an effective, methodical tool of interpretation, relevant for interpreting modern statutes and contracts as well. As noted by K. L. Sarkar, “…the Mimamsa rules have never been a dead letter. They were living principles…applicable to the construction of any system of law, ancient or modern, and can be extended to the interpretation of contracts and deeds…”[154]Mīmāṃsā principles have to be adapted to the modern legal system, with the combined efforts of connoisseurs of law, Sanskrit and Mīmāṃsā.

Mīmāṃsā and the modern principles of statutory interpretation are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they are complementary, and their application in appropriate instances, would lead to better evolution of laws and ensure greater certainty in interpretation.Consistent and accurate application of Mīmāṃsā principles by the higher judiciary, will lead to the development of an authoritative body of precedents, thereby contributing to the development of jurisprudence of statutory interpretation.

*Brunda Karanam is a lawyer qualified to practise Law in India. She holds a B.A., LL.B. (Hons) from the National Law School of India University, Bengaluru. She has also completed the BCL (Bachelor of Civil Law) programme from the University of Oxford, UK, and LL.M. (Masters in Law) from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, USA.

[1]Sarkar, K. L. (2013). K. L. Sarkar’s Mimansa Rules of Interpretation, Tagore Law Lectures – 1905 (M. Katju J, Ed.; 4th ed.). Thomson Reuters. (Original work published 1909).(“Sarkar, 1909/2013”). P. 33.

[2] M Rama Jois. (2004). Legal and constitutional history of India: ancient legal, judicial and constitutional system. Universal Law Pub. (“M Rama Jois, 2004”).P. 434.

[3]Apte, V. S. (2010). The Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary (4th ed.). Motilal Banarsidass.(“Apte, 2010”) P. 762

[4]Uttaramīmāṃsā​ or Jñānamīmāṃsā also known as Vedānta​ pertains to the study of the Upaniṣads and mostly deals with the “nature of the Brahman…” Apte, 2010. P. 762.

[5]Apte, 2010. P. 762.

[6]M Rama Jois, 2004. PP. 434-435.

[7]Srikrishna J, B.N. (2004). Maxwell v. Mimamsa. Student Bar Review, 16, 1-14. (Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004”)P. 4.

[8]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 434.

[9]Kishori Lal Sarkar. (2018 Classic Reprint Series. Forgotten Books). An introductory lecture on the subject of the rules of interpretation in Hindu law, with special reference to the Mimânsâ aphorisms as applied to Hindu law. Calcutta, S.L. Sarkar. (Original work published 1903).(“Kishori Lal Sarkar, 1903/2018”) P. 2.

[10]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 436.

[11]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P. 38 cited from Colebrooke’s Miscellaneous Essays, Vol. 1, P. 342.

[12]Kishori Lal Sarkar, 1903/2018. PP. 23-31.

[13] “Austin defines law as the command which obliges a person to a course of conduct”; according to Jaimini, “what is to be done as characterised by a command is Dharma” (चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थोधर्मः। – codanālakṣaṇo’rthodharmaḥJamini I. i. 2). In both the definitions of Jaimini and Austin, “(L)aw and legal duty are counterparts of each other”.Kishori Lal Sarkar, 1903/2018. PP. 23-24.

[14]Kishori Lal Sarkar, 1903/2018. P. 27.

[15]Kishori Lal Sarkar, 1903/2018. P. 28.

[16]Kishori Lal Sarkar, 1903/2018. P. 30.

[17]Kishori Lal Sarkar, 1903/2018. P.30.

[18]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P. 4.

[19]MuthukrishnaNaicken v. Ramachandra Naicken and Ors., (1919) 37 MLJ 489.

[20]Beni Prasad v. Hardai Bibi and Ors., (1892) ILR 14 All 67;BalusuGurulingaswami and Ors. v. BalusuRamalakshmamma and Ors., (1899) ILR 21 460; Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. Bhagwan Singh, (1895) ILR 17 All 294.

[21]In SagiliPedda Rami Reddi and Ors. v. NarreddiGangireddi, AIR 1925 Mad 807, Mutha Venkatasubba Rao J. made a reference to “Kramas” – Shruti-krama, Arthakrama and Padakrama in Mimamsa Sutras while deciding the order of succession (Paras. 52-54). In Narayan PundlikValanjuv. Lakshman DajiSirsekar, AIR 1927 Bom 456, the principle of Atidesha was applied by the Court in deciding on the succession to the property of a prostitute.

[22]Madhavrao Raghavendra and Ors. v. Raghavendrarao and Ors., AIR 1946 Bom 377.

[23] As remarked by Hon’ble M Katju, J., “It is deeply regrettable that in our law courts today these principles are not cited. Today, our so-called educated people are largely ignorant about the great intellectual achievements of our ancestors, and the intellectual treasury which they have bequeathed to us. The Mimansa Rules of Interpretation are one of these great achievements, but regrettably they are hardly ever used in our law courts. It may be mentioned that it is not stated anywhere in the Constitution of India that only Maxwell’s Principles of Interpretation can be utilised. We can utilise any system of interpretation which can help to resolve a difficulty. Principles of interpretation are not principles of law but are only a methodology for explaining the meaning of words used in a text. There is no reason why we should not use Mimansa Principles of Interpretation in appropriate occasions” – see B. Premanand and Ors. v. Mohan Koikal and Ors. AIR 2011 SC 1925.Paras. 34, 35.

[24]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 436.

[25]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P. 67.

[26]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P. 67.

[27]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P. 67.

[28]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P.71.

[29]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 448.

[30]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 448.

[31]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 448.

[32]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P. 71.

[33]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 449, Sarkar, 1909/2013. P. 71.

[34]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P. 71.

[35]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P. 71.

[36]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P. 71.

[37]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P. 72;M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 460.

[38]M Rama Jois, 2004. P.461.

[39]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 453.

[40]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P. 72.

[41]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 457.

[42]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 458.

[43]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 459.

[44]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 460.

[45]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P. 72.

[46]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P. 73.

[47]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 465;Sarkar, 1909/2013. P.127.

[48]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 465; Sarkar, 1909/2013. P.127.

[49]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P.127.

[50]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 465.

[51]Sarkar, 1909/2013. P.127.

[52]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 465.

[53]Sarkar, 1909/2013. PP.127, 128.

[54]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 469.

[55]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P.12.

[56]M Rama Jois, 2004. P.469.

[57] This Nyaya flows from a Nishedhaनकलञ्जंभक्षयेत् (nakalañjaṃbhakṣayet);M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 472.

[58]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 472.

[59] This Nyaya literally means “lamp in the centre”. M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 472.

[60]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 472.

[61]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P. 4.

[62] (1892) ILR 14 All 67.

[63]Beni Prasad.Para. 3.

[64]Beni Prasad.Para. 3.

[65]Beni Prasad.Para. 10.

[66]Beni Prasad. Para. 12.

[67]Beni Prasad. Para.87.

[68]Beni Prasad. Para.33.

[69]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P. 6.

[70] (2014) 14 SCC 286 (“GUI-ATI and Company”).

[71] The Entry in question read thus: “56. Milk powder, condensed milk, baby milk, baby food and all other foodstuffs or products, whether used as such or after mixing them with any other foodstuff or beverage, when sold in sealed or tinned containers.” GUI-ATI and Company.Para 3.

[72]GUI-ATI and Company.Para. 1.

[73]GUI-ATI and Company.Para. 12.

[74]GUI-ATI and Company.Para. 15.

[75] AIR 2011 SC 1925.

[76]Premanand.Para. 14.

[77]Premanand.Para. 35.

[78]The Court went on to state thus: “…There is the vedic verse: “Aindryagarhapatyamupatishthate”, which means “By the Mantra addressed to Indra establish the household fire.” This verse can possibly have several meanings viz. (1) worship Indra (2) worship Garhapatya (the household fire) (3) worship both, or (4) worship either”. “However, since the word ‘Garhapatyam’ is in the objective case, the verse has only one meaning, that is, ‘worship Garhapatya’. The word ‘Aindrya’ means ‘by Indra’, and hence the verse means that by verses dedicated to Indra one should worship Garhapatya. The word ‘Aindrya’ in this verse is a Linga, (in Mimansa Linga means the suggestive power of a word), while the words ‘GarhapatyamUpatishthate’ are the Shruti. According to the Mimamsa principles, the Shruti (literal meaning) will prevail over the Linga (suggestive power).” Premanand. Paras 36-37.

[79] (2009) 9 SCC 92.

[80]Vijay Narayan.Para. 5.

[81]Vijay Narayan.Para. 5.

[82] “Where the leading clause of a passage contains a general direction for the performance of a certain act and there is a prohibition of it under certain circumstance, the prohibition is to be taken as a legitimate exception or proviso (Paryudasa). Sabara discusses this principle and holds that if one provision conflicts with another in all respects, then there would be the option to accept one or the other (Vikalpa), but if a provision only excepts a particular situation out of a general rule, i.e., permits contravention of the rule in a given situation, such a provision must be treated as a Paryudasa, applicable to the situation specified therein”. M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 469.

[83] “For example, the prohibitory clause ‘Do not eat fermented (stale) food (nakalanjambhakshayet) is a Pratishedha; while the prohibition ‘those who have taken the Prajapati vow must not see the rising sun’ is a Paryudasa. In the second place, Pratishedhas are divided practically into two sub-clauses viz. those which prohibit a thing without any reference to the manner in which it may be used, and those which prohibit it only as regards a particular mode of using. For instance, ‘Do not eat fermented food’ prohibits the use of it under all circumstances, while ‘Do not use the Sorasi vessel at dead of night’ forbids the use of the vessel only at the dead of night”. Vijay Narayan. Para.10.

[84] “These are the four classes of negative clauses. The first class, of which the Kalanja (fermented food) clause is an example, may well be called a condemnatory prohibition. The second class consists also of absolute prohibitions of things under certain circumstances, as in the case of the Sorasi vessel. The third class consists of prohibitions in relation to persons in a given situation, as in the case of the Prajapati vow. The fourth class restricts the scope of action of persons engaged in fulfilling an injunction, as regards the time, place or manner of carrying out the substantive element of the injunction. Thus we see that in the Mimansa system as regards negative injunctions (such as the one contained in the proviso to Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act) there is a much deeper discussion on the subject than that done by Western Jurists. The Western writers on the subject of interpretation (like Maxwell, Craies, etc.) only say that ordinarily negative words are mandatory, but there is no deeper discussion on the subject, no classification of the kinds of negative injunctions and their effects”. Vijay Narayan. Paras. 11,12.

[85]Vijay Narayan. Para. 16.

[86]In Ganpatrao and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., 2018 (1) CCC 157, the High Court of Bombay had to interpret Section 9 (1-C) of the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994, which prohibited the removal of organs or tissues from a mentally challenged person before his death. The Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Narayan.Applying the Kalanja principle, the Court held that Section 9(1-C) was a prohibition against the world at large.Further, as the language of the statute was plain and clear, literal rule had to be adopted.Ganpatrao. Para. 16.

[87]M Rama Jois, 2004. P. 472.

[88]Vijay Narayan. Para. 17.

[89]Vijay Narayan. Para. 19.

[90]Surjit Singh v. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd., AIR 2008 SC 2226.

[91] “443. Default of payment — If, on or before the due date, the rent or other charges in respect of the telephone service provided are not paid by the subscriber in accordance with these rules, or bills for charges in respect of calls of phonograms or other dues from the subscriber are not duly paid by him, any telephone or telephones or any telex service rented by him, may be disconnected without notice…”. Rule 443, Indian Telegraph Rules”.Surjit Singh. Para. 7.

[92]Surjit Singh. Para. 8.

[93]According to Francis Bennion, “A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by- (a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in this Code called a purposive-and-literal construction), or (b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive and strained construction)”.[93]Hindustan Lever Ltd v. Ashok Vishnu Kate and Ors, 1996 ILLJ 899 SC as cited in Surjit Singh. Para. 25.

[94]Surjit Singh.Para. 28.

[95] “Usually the literal meaning is followed, but sometimes, the suggestive or figurative meanings are adopted. As regards the suggestive meaning (Lakshana), the oft-quoted example is ‘GangayamGoshah’, i.e, “I live on the Ganges”. This sentence cannot be literally interpreted because no one can live on the surface of the Ganges river. Hence, it has to be interpreted to mean “I live on the bank of the Ganga river”. As regards the third meaning Vyanjana, the oft-quoted example is ‘GatoAstamarka’ which means: “the sun has set”. Here the real meaning has in fact nothing to do with the sun or its setting, but it really means “light the lamp” or “let us go home” (because the sun has set)”. Surjit Singh.Para 27.

[96]Surjit Singh. Paras. 38,39.

[97] AIR 1988 SC 2239.

[98]Surjit Singh. Paras. 41,42.

[99]Surjit Singh. Paras. 53-56.

[100]Udai Shanker Singh v. Branch Manager, L.I.C. and Ors., 1998 (33) ALR 302 (“Udai Shanker Singh”).

[101]Udai Shanker Singh. Para. 12.

[102]Udai Shanker Singh. Para. 13.

[103]Udai Shanker Singh.Para. 13.

[104]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P.9.

[105] (2008) 9 SCC 284 (“Rajbir Singh”).

[106]Rajbir Singh.Para. 21.

[107]Rajbir Singh.Para. 21.

[108]Mahabir Prasad Dwivedi v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1992 All 351 (“Mahabir Prasad”).

[109] “The anusanga principle (or elliptical extension) states that an expression occurring in one clause is often meant also for a neighbouring clause, and it is only for economy that it is only mentioned in the former (see Jaimini 2,2,16). The anusanga principle has a further sub-categorisation. If a clause which occurs in a subsequent sentence is to be, read into a previous sentence it is a case of Tadapakarsha, but when it is vice versa it is case of Tadutkarsha, Jaimini deprecates Tadapakarsha (i.e. transference backwards) and permits it only in exceptional cases. However, there is no deprecation of Tadutakarsha. Since in the present case relating to the second proviso to S. 7A(1) of the U.P. Town Areas Act we are concerned with Tadutkarsha such transference can be readily accepted”. Mahabir Prasad. Para. 33.

[110]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P. 12.

[111]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P. 12.

[112]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P. 12.

[113] (2008) 4 SCC 755 (“Gujarat Urja”).

[114]Gujarat Urja.Para. 16.

[115]Gujarat Urja.Para. 39.

[116]Gujarat Urja. Paras. 39, 40.

[117]Gujarat Urja. Para. 41.

[118]Gujarat Urja.Paras. 41-43.

[119]Gujarat Urja.Para. 48.

[120] (2006) 12 SCC 583.

[121]IspatIndustries.Para. 17.

[122]Ispat Industries. Para. 19.

[123] 1994 (68) FLR 533.

[124]Amit Plastic. Paras. 13-23.

[125]Amit Plastic. Paras. 24-26.

[126]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P. 11.

[127]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P. 11.

[128] (2007) 13 SCC 246 (“UPAICLtd.”).

[129]UPAIC Ltd. Para. 11.

[130]UPAIC Ltd. Para. 13.

[131]UPAIC Ltd. Para. 14.

[132]UPAIC Ltd. Para. 16.

[133]Craft Interiors Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore and Ors., (2006) 12 SCC 250 (“Craft Interiors”).

[134]Craft Interiors. Para. 5.

[135]Craft Interiors. Para. 6.

[136]Craft Interiors. Para. 7.

[137]Craft Interiors. Para. 8.

[138]Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta, (1969) 1 SCC 555 (“Yogendra Nath”).

[139]Yogendra Nath. Para. 2.

[140]Yogendra Nath. Para. 5.

[141]Yogendra Nath. Para 7.

[142]AmitkumarDineshchandraRavalv.Managing Director, Madhya Gujarat Vij Company Ltd., MANU/GJ/0272/2022 (“Amitkumar”).

[143]Amitkumar. Paras. 5,6.

[144]Amitkumar. Para. 6.

[145]Amitkumar. Para. 6.3.

[146]Amitkumar. Para. 6.3.

[147]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P.13.

[148]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P.13.

[149]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P.14.

[150]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P.13.

[151]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P.14.

[152]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P.14.

[153]Srikrishna J, B.N. 2004. P.14.

[154]Kishori Lal Sarkar, 1903/2018. P. 19.

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